W. Wolfe

Important historical work poorly read

Revisado: 05-19-23

Braddock's defeat has always presented a bit of a paradox. On one hand is the astonishing logistical achievement of getting an army with artillery from the Chesapeake to the Forks of the Ohio in 1755. On the other, the equally astonishing military disaster that befell that army just as it appeared to have passed through the most arduous and dangerous stages of its march. The conventional explanations, almost from the immediate aftermath, have focused on Braddock's personal failings: his arrogance, his rigidity, his tactlessness towards British colonials and Native Americans, and his lack of experience, in terms of both North America and even combat. The odd picture is of a doddering, blundering, incompetent who somehow manages, apparently by accident, to first get several thousand troops, with the heaviest artillery train ever seen in North America, to the far fringes of British settlement and then lead a strike force of 1,500 a further 110 miles through unsettled, mountainous terrain, cutting old-growth forest and building a road as they go while successfully fending off French and Indian attacks. All this in the face of an utter breakdown of needed support from colonial governments at odds with each other and rent by bitter contention between royal governors and their respective assemblies.

David Preston has compiled and synthesized previously unexamined or misinterpreted sources from British, American, Canadian, and French archives to produce a much more balanced picture of the campaign and of Braddock himself. Preston presents evidence and arguments that Braddock (1) understood the need for Native American support and displayed a rather deft touch in trying to get it, (2) along with his oft-maligned quartermaster Sir John St. Clair, had a firm grasp of logistics and the movement of troops and supplies, even in the grueling environment of the Appalachian frontier, (3) up to the final debacle had been diligent about guarding his flanks, routing several French and Indian scouting parties and attempted ambushes, and (4) proved himself a "soldier's general" whose commitment to military discipline was tempered by a profound concern for the welfare of his troops, reflected in his popularity among the ranks.

Preston examines important factors largely ignored or downplayed in many previous treatments of the campaign. Perhaps the most significant of these is the extreme logistical vulnerability of Fort Duquesne, at the far end of a supply line longer and no less daunting than that of Braddock himself. He shows that Braddock had the misfortune of completing his epic march at exactly the moment when the size of the French and Indian forces was at an unsustainable peak: a few weeks earlier or later would have found a much reduced force and might have seen a very different result.

Preston also aligns with other recent works on the colonial frontier in acknowledging the agency and independent geopolitical and diplomatic interests of various Native American leaders and communities. He argues that the massive imbalance of the Indian support for the two sides in the campaign was not a simple reflection of Braddock's tone-deaf cultural ineptness but due to a range of factors, including (1) the far greater breadth and depth of French-Indian alliances, (2) the success of French intelligence in discerning British intentions, (3) the proactive mobilization of Indian forces from across New France's far-flung trading network, (4) the failure of colonial governors, especially James Glen of South Carolina, in fulfilling their promises to mobilize large numbers of Cherokee and Catawba allies, and (5) the uncertainty and caution of the upper Ohio country Indians, many of whom stepped aside to see how things turned out.

Unfortunately, the Audible audiobook is marred by an indefensibly inept narration. The central event is a military clash between the French and British empires. Predictably, the book is peppered with French place, personal, and organizational names and terms. There is simply no excuse in failing to engage a narrator who is comfortable reading French aloud. Michael Quinlan's obvious struggles produce a grating series of inconsistent manglings--Beaujeu becomes "Buh-jew," Vaudreuil "Voo-droh'" etc., etc. Extended quotations from French correspondence will have anyone with the most fleeting acquaintance of La Belle Langue cringing. Nor are the mispronunciations confined to French. "Lichens" are "litchens," and we hear twice of a British officer's indulgence in "Gloster-shy-er cheese," even though other British counties are pronounced correctly.

Narration aside, this is an important study of a critical event in the colonial relations between Britain and France and ultimately between Britain and her American colonies. Readers with an interest in colonial history generally, and especially in the French and Indian War and the American Revolution, will find much of value in this accessible, groundbreaking book.

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