Lobster Antenna Spotter

Incoherent at best

Revisado: 05-11-24

Story : 1 star.

In this book, Scott gives us a list of policy recommendations alongside charts and graphs telling us why they would be good or needed policies. The policies are mostly fine and, on balance, even quite progressive.

In fact, most of the policies are not new ideas. Many of the policy ideas here go back as far as the charts, and further. Most of the trends and possible solutions have not been unnoticed.

As the author notes, some of the policies have been in law in the past but were overturned or changed, ostensibly for reasons that would have been meaningful to the folks that supported those changes.

Other of these policies have been championed by progressives for years and have been blocked from becoming law or even being taken up, ostensibly for the same types of reasons.

When it comes to the politics, Scott tells us that the hard part is done, and the whats left to do is recognize the obvious problems and do the common sense things things to fix them. If only we can get the right attitude. Do we even care about the kids?

For Scott, what’s holding us back from getting policies like this involves a lack of optimism, among reasonable people, that things can be improved. And this cedes politics to the partisan ideologues. People care too strongly for their side, or don't care at all maybe dont believe in America at all. It’s not a new theory of politics.

To gauge the plausibility of the theory, consider the Obama campaign. Obama campaigned on a lot of these same progressive policies, popularly promising hope and change. Little was said about the details of how they would get done, but there was high enthusiasm for changes like these.

Obama had 8 years. Those 8 years, born from a swell of optimism about a future shaped by progress, ended with basically none of these policies being made law.

Why? What happened?

Scott’s theory of the case is going to look something like this: “Partisanship”.

During Obama’s tenure, this theory will hold, there was an environment of partisanship and polarization. Obama failed to deliver these goods because partisan conservatives blocked him, and his base of support was too polarized to win the moderate conservatives over.

The theorized solution lies in moderation, forming a coalition of reasonable people in the center, that are less committed to the labels and more concerned with common sense, in the interests of the kids no less.

And to do this, while also championing a largely progressive policy set, you need to be willing to compromise. To reach across the isle and give reasonable conservatives something that they can support. Something reasonable, like cutting social security.

Cutting social security has been a long time policy goal of conservatives, but they haven’t been able to get it done because it would be wildly unpopular, if they even could get it passed, it would be on party lines and they would take blame.

So the theory is that if you offer the reasonable conservatives some of their policy goals, they will in turn support the reasonable progressive policies in the agenda, and the reasonable center can shed the fetters of partisan division, and just do common sense things because they care about the kids, and believe in America.


So when this theory is put into practice, what you often find is that the policies that are going to win the reasonable conservatives over need to be prioritized. The idea is that you need them on board to pass the more progressive stuff, and to get them on board you need to start with their stuff.

And what you find, in practice, is bipartisan support to adopt polices that appeal to conservatives, but conservatives don’t want to be blamed for, because the policies aren’t that popular.

And what you find after that, in practice, is that the bipartisan support for passing the progressive policies in the agenda becomes a lot less energetic, and generally falls apart.

And what you find, in practice, is that breakdown of the anti-partisanship coalition, and the failure to pass the more progressive parts of the agenda, gets explained away as being caused by the progressives being too ideological and too extreme and so the conservatives don’t cooperate.

And this is literally why we have the charts and graphs Scott is showing us. This strategy is why, despite a history of people calling for policies like the positive ones Scott recommends, the unpopular policies and repeals, that Scott tells us us in his book are responsible for causing the conditions charted and graphed, have been adopted instead. Is it hypoxic in here or is it just me?


Scott believes, or would have us believe, that this is not exactly what would have happened under a guy like Mike Bloomberg for example. As if Mike Bloomberg wouldn’t have found a way to trip on his own shoelaces, spill his papers all over the floor and get the “progressive policies” pile all mixed up with the “stupid policies” pile, accidentally change the subject to something goofy, and then chastise those to his left of being too ideological and divisive for pointing to the important stuff.

Scott believes, or would have us believe, that if Andrew Yang had called it a negative-tax, he could have gotten conservatives on board. But for a branding error, Andrew Yang might have been able to build a popular coalition and, with the help of conservatives, move a largely progressive agenda. Wait, that Andrew Yang? Yes, that Andrew Yang. How? He would do in on a strength of a broad charisma and a practical operator mentality that would make Obama look like… well… like Andrew Yang.

As Christopher Hitchens without the MBA might say, "Believe it if you can."


Don’t get me wrong, Scott doesn’t talk about any of this stuff in his book.

Despite having dates on his charts that go back in time, giving a feeling of history, Scott makes no attempt to put them together in to a story that is taking place in time and with actual chains of causation. He makes no real case for why next time will be different than last time. Despite his recognition that the trends he charts go back decades, he doesn’t really seem to consider lessons from times when these policies failed to get implemented or were repealed. He offers no real theory of history.

Despite telling us the names of some of the specific laws or repeals, which function as the proximate cause of the given problems, Scott makes no attempt to examine why and how those specific laws or repeals were supplied with the energy needed to pass. He makes no real case for why that same mechanism would not present a resistance to its undoing. Despite his recognition that there are actors taking actions, he really doesn’t seem to consider what anyone could or might actually do, and what it might mean to change the tide. He offers no real theory of power.


“That’s not what this book is supposed to about!” someone shouts from the back. I hear you.

And you are correct. Because, to someone like Scott, phrases like "theory of history" and "theory of power" are for wanna-be radicals and revolutionaries.

To those in Scott's cohort who share his politics, political action that does not take as assumed that the "right ideas" can generate the political energy necessary to become law on their merits... To someone who believes that a lack of conversation and common sense is the principle reason that our laws are the laws we have, as if we find them that way, arising from nature, without much intent... To someone who thinks that hoping your opponents will be won over by good branding, and their constituents will stop feeling so strongly... To that person most political action looks like creating chaos, or tearing the system down, just being being an ideologue or déclassé.

Questions that aim to understand the obstacles that may need to be planned for and strategies that may be needed to actually get this list of progressive policies turned in to actual law, and a focus on action, are appear to be deeply under-appreciated by this man of business.

If asked about this theory of politics, and how its supposed to work, a fan of Scott’s may say something like “I don’t know if a business professor at the NYU Stern school of business is ever gonna give you the depth you’re longing for, but his books probably serve the best chance of giving you that satisfaction.”

And you know what? They would be right about one thing. This business professor at the NYU Stern school of business is probably not ever gonna give me the depth I am longing for.

But they would be wrong about another thing. His books probably do not serve the best chance of giving me that satisfaction.

His books, or at least the book under review, will give you a fairly decontextualized list of policies, some of which would be very nice to have.

And it will do it in a tone that suggests that if you were as smart as the author you would have already seen that this stuff is really common sense, and it would be easy (the hard part is already done) to get this stuff done if would would all just care a little less about our partisan issues, and really consider that we alls should give ourselves a good attitude check? Do we even care about our kids?




Which brings me to Performance : 5 Stars.

"A walking applause break" - William M.




Overall : 4 stars.

I love it when authors read their own books.

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Excellent, both Locke's work and Langton's voice

Revisado: 03-13-18

It takes a few moments to calibrate your mind to the no-longer-common language, however it quickly becomes as comprehensible as any

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