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Hewitt v. United States

Before the First Step Act was enacted in 2018, federal judges were required to sentence first-time offenders convicted of violating 18 U. S. C. §924(c)—a law that criminalizes possessing a firearm while committing other crimes—to “stacked” 25-year periods of incarceration. The First Step Act eliminated this harsh mandatory minimum penalty. Section 403(b) of the Act also made its more lenient penalties partially retroactive. Specifically, if a sentence “has not been imposed” upon an eligible §924(c) offender as of the date of the First Step Act’s enactment, the Act applies. The question presented here concerns an edge case: What penalties apply when a §924(c) offender had been sentenced as of the Act’s enactment, but that sentence was subsequently vacated, such that the offender must face a post-Act resentencing? In 2009, petitioners Tony Hewitt, Corey Duffey, and Jarvis Ross were convicted of multiple counts of bank robbery and conspiracy to commit bank robbery, along with corresponding §924(c) offenses for use of a firearm during a crime of violence. Each petitioner received a mandatory 5-year sentence for his first §924(c) count of conviction and, despite being first-time offenders, each received 25-year mandatory sentences on every §924(c) count beyond his first. Thus, each petitioner’s sentence exceeded 325 years. Petitioners successfully challenged some of their convictions on direct appeal, and the Fifth Circuit vacated petitioners’ sentences. In 2012, the District Court resentenced each petitioner to between 285 and 305 years on the counts that remained.

In 2019, the Court held that the “crime of violence” definition the Government routinely used to support some §924(c) convictions was unconstitutionally vague. See United States v. Davis, 588 U. S. 445, 470. Because that holding potentially affected some of petitioners’ remaining convictions, the Fifth Circuit granted petitioners authorization to file a second or successive postconviction motion. The District Court then vacated the impacted §924(c) convictions, as well as petitioners’ sentences. When the District Court held resentencings for the remaining convictions, petitioners argued that the First Step Act’s 5- year—not 25-year—mandatory minimum penalties applied. Petitioners argued they were entitled to retroactive application of the Act’s more lenient penalties because a vacated prior sentence is not a sentence that “has . . . been imposed” for purposes of §403(b). The District Court disagreed and resentenced petitioners under the pre-Act sentencing scheme, giving them stacked 25-year mandatory minimums for each §924(c) count of conviction beyond their first. Petitioners thus each received sentences of 130 years or more. On appeal, petitioners and the Government agreed that the First Step Act should have applied at petitioners’ resentencings. The Fifth Circuit denied their joint request for vacatur. In that court’s view, §403(b) applies only “to defendants for whom ‘a sentence . . . ha[d] not been imposed’ as of the enactment date.” 92 F. 4th 304, 310. Because each petitioner had been sentenced (twice) prior to the Act’s enactment, the panel concluded that petitioners were not eligible for the First Step Act’s more lenient mandatory minimums.

Held: The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded. Pp. 6–12. 92 F. 4th 304, reversed and remanded.

JACKSON, J., delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, and III, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and GORSUCH, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Parts IV and V, in which SOTOMAYOR and KAGAN, JJ., joined. ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS, KAVANAUGH, and BARRETT, JJ., joined.

Read by RJ Dieken.