On December 31, 2024, the last contract that the Russian energy giant Gazprom had for the over-land supply of natural gas to Europe came to an end. This was the result of Ukraine refusing to renew the transit contract that had been in place since 2019 and contributed around $5bn to Gazprom’s annual revenue. Given that Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, this was not an unreasonable decision for the government in Kyiv to take. Nor was it unpredictable – already in the summer of 2023, Ukraine had indicated that it had no intention to extend the contract with Gazprom.By the time the contract came to an end, the dependency of the European Union on Russia for gas had been reduced from its peak above 40% just before the beginning of the Russian aggression against Ukraine to below 10%. And only around half of that came via Ukraine. The EU and its member states were well-prepared for the cut-off, having secured alternative suppliers and sitting on full gas storage tanks to see them through the winter.Moreover, the European energy infrastructure of pipelines and the electricity transmission grid have sufficient levels of in-built flexibility and redundancy and have proved resilient to cope with the sudden lack of supply of gas via Ukraine. This even included the capacity of additional provision of electricity to Moldova – a small country wedged between Romania and Ukraine, which had been highly dependent on gas supplies via Ukraine.The end of over-land gas supplies and the EU’s ability to cope with this were thus clearly foreseeable for everyone – except, apparently, Slovakia’s prime minister Robert Fico. He predicted a severely negative impact on the EU, including in terms of the costs and availability of heating and electricity. As his row with Ukraine’s president Volodymyr Zelenskyy escalated, Fico also threatened to cut off electricity supplies to Ukraine and warned of further unspecified retaliation measures.Perhaps most shockingly, Fico even went to Moscow on December 22, 2024, for direct talks with Vladimir Putin. This made him only the third EU leader to go to Russia since the start of the war almost three years ago. The other two that went to meet the Russian president were the outgoing Austrian chancellor, Karl Nehammer, and the Hungarian prime minister, Victor Orban.Fico and Orban in particular are well-known for their pro-Russian leanings. They have repeatedly used their leverage inside the EU and NATO to undercut support for Ukraine. Trying to play the energy card as they did over the end of the Gazprom deal, thus, has less to do with energy security. Rather, it is part of a political agenda of some of the populist European far right who are more than willing to act as a fifth column for Russia inside western institutions.For some time now, populist parties have played on voters’ fears of ever-increasing inflation, immigration and an escalation of the war in Ukraine that could ultimately drag NATO and the EU into a direct confrontation with Russia. Parties on the extreme left and right have done well at the polls last year, including in Austria, France, and Romania. They are also likely to be the main beneficiaries of parliamentary elections in Germany in February and potentially of presidential elections in Poland in May. Meanwhile, the resignation of Chancellor Nehammer in Vienna on January 3, 2025, following the collapse of coalition negotiations among three centrist parties, has also opened up a pathway to power for the far-right, pro-Russian Austrian Freedom Party.The general shift to the political extremes, however, should not be mistaken for a broader, Europe-wide tendency towards accommodating Russia. This is certainly part of the agenda of Orban and Fico, as well as of elements in the German and Austrian far right (and to an extent the German far left). But others in the European right, like Italy’s Giorgia Meloni and France’s Marine Le Pen, have clearly distanced themselves from Putin’s war. Meloni has gone beyond that and been a strong and outspoken supporter of Ukraine.Those European leaders closest to the Russian president’s agenda also share an anti-democratic and authoritarian streak with him. Whatever their reasons for doing so, they appear to be working towards the weakening western support for Ukraine and eroding western leadership in the current international order – much like Putin himself.They might all be hoping that the return of Donald Trump to the White House will benefit their own aspirations. And in the short term, this may well prove to be the case. Putin may get a good deal from Trump on Ukraine. Orban, Fico and others may get audiences with Trump (and financial support from Elon Musk).Yet, for Trump and most in his team, the big prize is defeating China. Both Putin and Orban are likely to fall out of the incoming American president’s good graces if they are unwilling to cut their ties with Beijing – something almost inconceivable for Russia to...
