Episodes

  • Trump is still the only one with a chance of getting Ukraine and Russia to the table

    Trump is still the only one with a chance of getting Ukraine and Russia to the table
    Apr 25 2025
    United States President Donald Trump is finding the reality of negotiations to bring about a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine yet again less easy than he imagined on the campaign trail before returning to the White House for a second term. Having boasted about ending the war in Ukraine in 24 hours, he now finds himself close to the 100-day mark of his second term oscillating between threatening to walk away from ceasefire negotiations and promising that a deal was “very close”.Neither is a realistic outcome at this moment.Ministerial-level talks between the US, Ukraine, and the European coalition of the willing led by the UK, France, and Germany, to discuss ending the war fell through on Wednesday (April 23) after US Secretary of State Marco Rubio cancelled his participation, prompting British, French and German counterparts to pull out as well and releasing their own proposals for a deal on April 25.For Mr Trump, Ukraine is an important puzzle piece in his reconfiguration of US-Russia relations which are critical to his focus on China.The US president is keen to drive a wedge between Moscow and Beijing. This strategy is often referred to as a “reverse Kissinger”, in reference to the late American grand strategist’s success of capitalising on the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s and normalising US relations with communist China. That Mr Trump and his advisers lack the strategic acumen of Henry Kissinger and that there is no Russia-China split on the horizon to capitalise on does not mean that rapprochement between the US and Russia is impossible.On the contrary, if the terms were right, both Mr Trump and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, might yet seal a deal to serve their interests – but such a deal will unlikely bring an end to the war against Ukraine.The US is still the only player in the complex dynamics of negotiations with even a remote chance of getting a deal done — because of the leverage the Trump administration has over Russia and Ukraine. Past initiatives to end the war against Ukraine, including those by China, Brazil, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia and the Vatican, never got any traction. Their sponsors generally lacked the ability or, in China’s case, the will, to bring Kyiv and Moscow to the negotiation table.Mr Trump has so far focused on incentives in his dealings with Russia. He can offer Mr Putin much of what the Kremlin wants. Washington’s current peace plan includes the recognition of Moscow’s territorial gains in Ukraine, the lifting of all US sanctions and ruling out future NATO membership for Kyiv.If Trump forges ahead with such a deal, the consequential weakening of the transatlantic alliance would also ensure, in the Kremlin’s eyes, a reordering of European security for the benefit of Russia. It would include US withdrawal from Europe and put limits on the size and capabilities of Ukraine’s armed forces.It is not clear, however, what, if anything, Russia has offered in return — apart from relinquishing claims to territory that Moscow does not yet control.By contrast, the US president has concentrated on pressure when it comes to the relationship with his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Mr Trump has been unequivocal that he will suspend military aid and intelligence sharing as leverage. This has made sure that Kyiv keeps engaged in negotiations and accepts giving the US privileged access to Ukraine’s mineral and energy resources and infrastructure.The limits of such leverage, however, are clear: Mr Zelenskyy ruled out a recognition of Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, proposed in the US peace deal. Mr Trump’s response was to lash out on Truth Social, blaming Zelenskyy for prolonging the “killing field”.The gap between what the US has put on the table and what Ukraine and its European partners will accept remains wide.If, in light of these difficulties, he did abandon talks, Mr Trump could still cut a deal with Mr Putin in an effort to pry him away from China. But such a deal — on Russia’s terms — would almost inevitably deal another major, and potentially fatal, blow to the American alliance system in Europe and further increase doubt about the dependability of the US as a partner among its Asian allies.Both outcomes would be detrimental to US interests in its rivalry with China and are unlikely to be offset by vague hopes of the Kremlin realigning with the White House.Alternatively, Mr Trump could turn against Mr Putin for failing to agree to a ceasefire and finally implement his earlier threat to impose large-scale sanctions on Russia. Unlikely as it is at the moment, this would preserve what is left of the transatlantic alliance, at least for the time being. It would also allow Mr Trump to conclude his coveted minerals deal with Ukraine. If it means the continuation of US military support and intelligence sharing, such an outcome would clearly be problematic for Mr Putin.This appears to be a reality that the Kremlin...
    Show more Show less
    8 mins
  • The path to peace in Ukraine narrows down further — even if Trump secures a ceasefire

    The path to peace in Ukraine narrows down further — even if Trump secures a ceasefire
    Apr 22 2025
    After more than three years of war, the prospects of peace for Ukraine remain slim. There is no obvious, credible pathway even to a ceasefire, given Russia's refusal to extend a brief and shaky truce over Easter — despite the US, UK and Ukraine all signalling their support for this idea. And even if the considerable hurdles impeding a ceasefire deal could be overcome, a more fundamental problem would remain: none of the key players in the conflict appear to have a plan for an agreement that is likely to be acceptable to both Kyiv and Moscow.Less than a year ago, there were at least seven different third-party peace proposals.At one level this is surprising. Less than a year ago, there were at least seven different third-party peace proposals. Among them, China, Brazil, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia and the Vatican had their distinct visions for how to achieve peace. In addition, there was a multilateral proposal by a group of African states, led by South Africa, and a joint proposal by China and Brazil.The best that could be said about these plans last autumn was that several of their sponsors had converged around the principles of the China-Brazil proposal by forming a Chinese-led "Friends of Peace" group in the margins of the UN General Assembly in September 2024. Remarkably — because it was in clear contravention of the western opposition to a ceasefire at the time — EU and NATO members Hungary and Slovakia also joined the group, alongside South Africa, Egypt, Indonesia, Türkiye, and other countries from the global south. By the end of 2024, this initiative, however, clearly had run its course and arrived at a dead end, as indicated in a short press release after the only other meeting the group held at the level of their countries' permanent representatives to the UN. A statement on what Beijing calls the Ukraine crisis by China's foreign minister, Wang Yi, on March 7, 2025, made no mention of the group. More importantly, that statement also seemed to indicate that China was no longer pursuing an active role in mediation, limiting its involvement to simply welcoming and supporting "all efforts for peace".What these plans had in common was their primary focus on a ceasefire as a stepping stone to negotiations about an actual peace agreement. They were all light on detail of what a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine would entail but were nonetheless roundly rejected by Ukraine and its western allies as favouring Russia. Given that a ceasefire would simply freeze the front lines and very likely make them permanent with or without a subsequent peace agreement, this was not an unreasonable position. Except that what Ukraine proposed instead — and what its western allies backed, at least rhetorically — was hardly more viable. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's 2022 peace plan was already on life support at the time of the first "Summit on Peace in Ukraine” in Switzerland in June 2024. And when merely 84 of the 100 delegations attending the summit (out of 160 invited) supported a watered-down version of Zelensky's plan in their final communique without agreement on a follow-up meeting, Ukraine's peace plan was dead in the water. Its 'replacement' — Ukraine's internal resilience plan — with its focus on ensuring that the country can survive a long war of attrition with Russia is anything but a peace plan.Among its European allies, the absence of a peace plan is similarly glaring, albeit for different reasons. Europe remains committed to supporting Kyiv, but the Russian war against Ukraine is only one — though clearly the most important — security priority for an emerging coalition of the willing among western backers of Ukraine. For them, it is important to keep Ukraine in the fight while they build up their own defences in a new international order in which the world might well be carved up into American, Russian and Chinese spheres of influence.Such a carve-up is at the heart of efforts by US president Donald Trump who seeks to secure a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine, as well as a deal that would give the US privileged access to Ukrainian resources, partly as a repayment for US support in the war to date. The latter appears to be relatively close to conclusion after it initially fell apart during an extraordinarily acrimonious press conference in the White House on February 28.The ceasefire deal Trump appears to envisage would divide Ukraine itself into spheres of influence…The ceasefire deal Trump appears to envisage would divide Ukraine itself into spheres of influence — as recently suggested by Trump's special envoy for Ukraine, retired general Keith Kellogg. Yet even such a pro-Moscow arrangement that would offer Putin control of 20% of Ukraine continues to elude negotiators, primarily because Russian president Vladimir Putin has few incentives to settle for less than Russia’s maximum demands and stop a war that he thinks he is still able to win on the battlefield,...
    Show more Show less
    8 mins
  • Washington and Moscow continue to squabble over the Arctic

    Washington and Moscow continue to squabble over the Arctic
    Apr 5 2025
    On April 3, flanked by the outgoing and incoming prime ministers of Greenland, the Danish leader, Mette Frederiksen, reiterated that “you cannot annex another country”. This was not a message sent to Russian president Vladimir Putin, but to Donald Trump, the president of one of her country’s closest allies, who has threatened to take over Greenland.Frederiksen, speaking in Greenland’s capital Nuuk, was stating something that is obvious under international law but can no longer be taken for granted in international politics. US foreign policy under Donald Trump has become a major driver of this uncertainty, playing into the hands of Russian, and potentially Chinese, territorial ambitions.The incoming Greenlandic prime minister, Jens-Frederik Nielsen, made it clear that it was for Greenlanders to determine their future, not the United States. Greenland formally became part of Denmark under the terms of the 1814 Treaty of Kiel, first as a colony and in 1953 as a province. Since 1979, it has enjoyed a large degree of autonomy. Polls suggest a majority of islanders want independence from Denmark in the future, but don’t want to be part of the US. As Nielsen put it in response to Marco Rubio, Trump’s secretary of state, “He is not right that Greenland wants to secede tomorrow. He is right that Greenland does not want to be Danish, but Greenland certainly doesn't want to be American either."Trump’s interest in Greenland is often associated with the island’s vast, but largely untapped, mineral resources. But its strategic location is arguably an even greater asset.Trump’s interest in Greenland is often associated with the island’s vast, but largely untapped, mineral resources. But its strategic location is arguably an even greater asset. Shipping routes through the Arctic have become more dependable and for longer periods of time during the year as a result of melting sea ice. The northwest passage (along the US and Canadian shorelines) and the northeast passage (along Russia’s Arctic coast) are often ice free now during the summer.This has increased opportunities for commercial shipping. For example, the distance for a container ship from Asia to Europe through the northeast passage can be up to three times shorter, compared to traditional routes through the Suez Canal or around Africa. Similarly, the northwest passage offers the shortest route between the east coast of the United States and Alaska. Add to that the likely substantial resources that the Arctic has, from oil and gas to minerals, and the entire region is beginning to look like a giant real estate deal in the making.The economic promise of the Arctic, and particularly the region’s greater accessibility, have also heightened military and security sensitivities.On March 27, the day before JD Vance, Trump's vice president, visited Greenland, Vladimir Putin gave a speech at the sixth international Arctic forum in Murmansk in Russia’s high north, warning of increased geopolitical rivalry. While he claimed that “Russia has never threatened anyone in the Arctic”, he was also quick to emphasise that Moscow was “enhancing the combat capabilities of the Armed Forces, and modernising military infrastructure facilities” in the Arctic.Equally worrying, Russia has increased its naval cooperation with China and given Beijing access, and a stake, in the Arctic.Equally worrying, Russia has increased its naval cooperation with China and given Beijing access, and a stake, in the Arctic. In April 2024, the two countries’ navies signed a cooperation agreement on search and rescue missions on the high seas.In September 2024, China participated in Russia’s largest naval manoeuvres in the post-cold war era, Ocean-2024, which were conducted in north Pacific and Arctic waters. The following month, Russian and Chinese coastguard vessels conducted their first joint patrol in the Arctic. Vance, therefore, has a point when he urges Greenland and Denmark to cut a deal with the US because the “island isn’t safe”. But this is hardly Denmark’s fault alone. The US airbase in Pituffik currently hosts some 200 American personnel — during the Cold War, the US maintained some seventeen installations on the island with 10,000 soldiers, according to Denmark’s foreign minister, Lars Lokke Rasmussen. Moreover, the 1951 Greenland Defence Agreement between Denmark and the United States and its amendment in 2004 grant Washington substantial rights in the island. This was further supplemented during the first Trump administration with a “Common Plan” to enhance cooperation between the US and Greenland, and even Project2025 merely recommends that “the next administration should pursue policies that enhance economic ties between the US and Greenland.”Yet, it is not just the United States that is now more concerned than ever that the Russia-China partnership has resulted in an increasingly military presence in the Arctic.Yet, it is not ...
    Show more Show less
    10 mins
  • And the ball is back in Washington's court

    And the ball is back in Washington's court
    Mar 19 2025
    By Stefan Wolff and Tetyana MalyarenkoAfter more than two hours on the phone on Tuesday, March 17, the US president, Donald Trump, and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, agreed to nothing more than what can at best be described as confidence-building measures. The two leaders came away from the call with a limited prisoner exchange, a suspension of attacks on energy infrastructure, and the creation of working groups to explore further steps towards a ceasefire and ultimately a peace agreement. This is most certainly not the actual ceasefire between Ukraine and the invading Russian military that Trump had tried to achieve. Putin made it crystal clear to Trump that he is not (yet) in the mood for any compromise.A less charitable way of looking at the outcome of the second call between the two presidents since Trump returned to the White House would be that the ball is now back in the American court. Putin made it crystal clear to Trump that he is not (yet) in the mood for any compromise.This is hardly surprising given recent events.The US has pressured Ukraine mercilessly into accepting a proposal for a 30-day ceasefire, which Trump hoped Russia would also agree to. But apart from a vague statement by Trump that he might consider sanctions against Russia, he has so far seemed unwilling to contemplate putting any meaningful equivalent pressure on Putin.On the ground, Russia has gained the upper hand in the Kursk region where Ukrainian troops have ceded back most of the territory they captured after a surprise offensive last summer. Once Putin’s forces, assisted by thousands of North Korean soldiers, have succeeded in driving the Ukrainians out of Russia, Kyiv will have lost its most valuable bargaining chip in negotiations with Moscow.Meanwhile, Russia has also made further gains on the frontlines inside Ukraine especially in parts of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia. Despite not yet having full control of them, these are two of the four regions (the other two are Donetsk and Luhansk) that Putin has claimed for Russia in their entirety since sham referendums in September 2022.If Russia were to capture yet more Ukrainian territory, it is likely that Putin would find it even easier to convince Trump that his demands are reasonable. The fact that Trump already hinted at a “dividing of assets”, including the nuclear power plant at Zaporizhzhia – Europe’s largest before its forced shutdown in September 2022 – is a worrying indication of how far the Russian president has already pushed the envelope.… for now, Kyiv is likely to continue to receive US aid.But a deal solely between Russia and the US is not going to work. In that sense, time is not only on Putin’s side but also on Zelensky’s. The Russian readout of the call between the two presidents claimed that they had discussed “the complete cessation of foreign military assistance and the provision of intelligence information to Kyiv” as a key condition for moving forward – something that Trump subsequently denied in an interview with Fox. This means that, for now, Kyiv is likely to continue to receive US aid.Perhaps more importantly in the long term, Europe is also doubling down on support for Ukraine. While Trump and Putin were discussing a carve-up of Ukraine over the phone, the president of the European commission, Ursula von der Leyen, left no doubt on where the EU stands. In a speech at the Royal Danish Military Academy foreshadowing the publication of the commission’s “Readiness 2030” white paper on bolstering European defences, she recommitted to developing European “capabilities to have credible deterrence” against a hostile Russian adversary. At the same time, the EU also approved the disbursement of the third payment of almost €3.5 billion worth of grants and loans to Kyiv under its Ukraine Facility.A few hours later, the German parliament passed a multi-billion Euro package that loosens the country’s tight borrowing rules to enable massive investments in defence. This follows announcements of increased defence spending elsewhere on the continent, including in the UK, Poland, and by the EU itself.Meanwhile, the UK and France are leading efforts to assemble a coalition of the willing to help Ukraine. Representatives of the 30-member group gathered in London on March 15 for further talks. Afterwards, the UK prime minister, Keir Starmer, released a statement saying that Ukraine’s western partners “will keep increasing the pressure on Russia, keep the military aid flowing to Ukraine and keep tightening the restrictions on Russia’s economy”.There is no doubt that these measures would be more effective if they had Washington’s full buy-in – but even without that they send a strong signal to both the Kremlin and the White House that Ukraine is not alone in its fight against Russia’s ongoing aggression.Russian manpower and firepower may dwarf that of Ukraine, but it would be no match for a Ukraine backed by ...
    Show more Show less
    7 mins
  • All eyes on Putin again

    All eyes on Putin again
    Mar 12 2025
    By Tetyana Malyarenko & Stefan WolffOn March 11, 2025, senior US and Ukrainian officials reached an agreement on an American proposal for a thirty-day ceasefire in the war in Ukraine after nine hours of negotiations behind closed doors in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.This does not mean that the guns in the war will now immediately fall silent. No ceasefire agreement between the warring parties — Russia and Ukraine — has been signed. In fact, it is not even clear how much detail is contained in the US ceasefire proposal and how much of it has already been discussed with Russia during earlier talks between senior US and Russian officials.Nonetheless, the deal signals a major step forward.From a Ukrainian perspective, it has several advantages. First, the major rift between Kyiv and Washington has at least been partially patched up. The minerals agreement — on hold since the shouting match between US president Donald Trump and his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, in the White House on February 28 — is back on, with Trump extending an invitation to Zelenskyy to return to Washington to sign it.Equally importantly for Kyiv, the resumption of US weapons deliveries to Ukraine and the lifting of the ban on intelligence sharing were part of the deal, and with immediate effect. This restores critical US battlefield support for Ukraine, including for Kyiv’s capability to strike targets deep inside Russia.Vladimir Putin … has to balance his war aims in Ukraine with the strategically arguably more important goal of rapprochement with the United States.By contrast, the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, is now in a somewhat trickier position. He has to balance his war aims in Ukraine with the strategically arguably more important goal of rapprochement with the United States.Talks between senior US and Russian officials on February 18, in the Saudi capital Riyadh, seemed to indicate that Moscow had won significant concessions from Washington, including on retaining illegally occupied territory and no NATO membership for Ukraine.These concessions may still be on the table, alongside other US offers to normalise relations and end Russia's isolation from the west. But this does not mean that Russia will be in any particular hurry to bring the fighting in Ukraine to an end. The country's economy has weathered western sanctions remarkably well so far. Putin is likely also keen on capitalising further on the momentum that his troops still have on the frontlines inside Ukraine. And he is unlikely to want to sit down to talk about a ceasefire, let alone a peace agreement, with Zelensky as long as Ukraine still holds territory in the Kursk region inside Russia. While Ukrainian troops have come under increasing pressure there recently and are in danger of being encircled, it is likely to take Russia some more time to force them to withdraw completely or to surrender.Putin is thus likely to play for more time in an effort to push his advantage on the ground while avoiding upsetting Trump.Putin is thus likely to play for more time in an effort to push his advantage on the ground while avoiding upsetting Trump. The deputy head of the upper house of the Russian parliament, the Federation Council, and chairman of its international affairs committee, Konstantin Kosachev, signalled as much after the US-Ukraine deal had been announced. He insisted that any agreements would have to be on Russian, rather than American, let alone Ukrainian, terms. The Kremlin’s immediate reaction also lacked enthusiasm. Putin’s spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, noted that Moscow was still awaiting detailed information on what Kyiv and Washington had agreed. Both of these initial responses indicate a willingness to talk, but they also signal that an agreement, even on a ceasefire, will very likely still require further negotiations.Playing for time will also allow Putin to avoid rebuffing the American proposal outright. To do so would be a huge gamble for the Russian president. Trump has already proven his willingness to exert maximum pressure on Ukraine — and he seems to have got his way. Ahead of the US-Ukraine meeting in Jeddah, he was also clear that he would consider further sanctions on Russia to force Moscow to accept an end to the fighting in Ukraine. Both of these steps — pressure on Ukraine and on Russia — are part of a plan developed by Trump’s special Ukraine envoy Keith Kellogg back in May 2024. Crucially, Kellogg also envisaged continuing “to arm Ukraine and strengthen its defences to ensure Russia will make no further advances and will not attack again after a ceasefire or peace agreement”. If Putin were to reject the current proposal, he would therefore not only risk a broader reset of US-Russia relations but potentially also lose his current battlefield advantage, as well as territory Moscow currently controls because a boost to Ukrainian military capabilities would likely shift the military balance of power, at ...
    Show more Show less
    7 mins
  • A coalition of the willing on European defence takes shape

    A coalition of the willing on European defence takes shape
    Mar 8 2025
    By Tetyana Malyarenko and Stefan WolffA week is a long time in politics, and with Donald Trump in the White House, it's even longer in international affairs. It has been eight days since the infamous shouting match on February 28 between Trump and his Ukrainian counterpart, Volodymyr Zelensky. Ever since, the near-total breakdown in the relationship between the US and Ukraine and the almost irreparable damage in the transatlantic relationship has become more of a certainty.Zelensky, urged by European leaders, including the British prime minister, Sir Keir Starmer, and the Nato secretary general, Mark Rutte, has tried to mend his ties with Trump. The US president acknowledged as much in his first post-inauguration speech to congress on March 5 saying that he appreciated Zelensky’s readiness to work for peace under US leadership.But that happened just 24 hours after he decided to halt all military aid to Ukraine. And since then, the new director of the CIA, John Ratcliffe, and Trump’s national security adviser, Mike Waltz, have confirmed that intelligence sharing with Kyiv, which was critical to Ukraine’s ability to hit strategic targets inside Russia, has also been suspended.Neither of these two moves have an immediate game-changing effect on the war, but they will certainly increase pressure on Ukraine to accept whatever deal Trump will ultimately make with Putin.Trump's manoeuvring does not only affect Ukraine, it has also had a profound impact on Europe.So far, so bad. Yet Trump's manoeuvring does not only affect Ukraine, it has also had a profound impact on the rest of Europe. On Sunday (March 2), in the immediate aftermath of the debacle in the White House, Starmer convened an emergency meeting in London.Much like the French president, Emmanuel Macron, who had invited key European leaders after the insults delivered by the US vice president, JD Vance, at the Munich Security Conference earlier in February, Starmer hosted a select number of European leaders, as well as the Canadian prime minister, Justin Trudeau. This "coalition of the willing" has been in the making for some time now and straddles the boundaries of the EU and Nato, including — apart from the UK — also non-EU members Norway and Turkey.Since the relatively disappointing first ever EU meeting solely focused on defence on February 3 — which was most notable for the absence of a European vision for the continent's role and place in a Trumpian world order — Europe has embarked on a course of more than just rhetorical change.The UK was first out of the tracks, announcing an increase of defence spending to 2.5% of GDP by 2027 on February 25, ahead of Starmer's visit to Washington. The British government then followed this up with a pledge of additional air defence missiles for Ukraine worth £1.6 billion on March 2. On March 6, Britain transferred £752 million — the first third of a £2.26 billion loan backed by profits from frozen Russian assets — to Ukraine for the purchase of military equipment.In a crucial boost to defence spending at the EU level, the president of the European commission, Ursula von der Leyen, announced the "ReArm Europe Plan" on March 4 which is projected to mobilise around €800 billion for European defence. This includes a "national escape clause" exempting EU members' national defence expenditures from the EU's deficit rules, a new loan instrument worth up to €150 billion, the use of already allocated funds in the EU budget for defence projects, and partnerships with the private sector through the Savings and Investment Union and the European Investment Bank.And perhaps most significantly, in Germany, the two main parties likely to form the next coalition government, on March 5 confirmed a major shift in the country's fiscal policy that will allow any defence spending above 1% of GDP to be financed outside the country's strict borrowing rules. This marks a critical point of departure for Germany not just in fiscal terms. It also sends an important political signal that Germany — the continent's largest economy — will use its financial and political muscle to strengthen the emerging coalition of the willing.These are all important steps. Provided that the current momentum is maintained, they are cumulatively likely to accelerate a European awakening. The challenges that Europe faces on the way to become strategically independent from the US are enormous, but they are not insurmountable. The conventional military threat posed by a revanchist and revisionist Russia is more easily manageable with the kinds of plans currently in the making. They are aimed to boost, among others, conventional forces, long-range missile strike and drone capabilities, and air and cyber defences. Close cooperation with Ukraine will add critical war-fighting experience which can further enhance the deterrent effect of a European coalition of the willing.Europe, however, remains vulnerable in terms of its nuclear ...
    Show more Show less
    9 mins
  • And the winner is…Vladimir Putin?

    And the winner is…Vladimir Putin?
    Mar 4 2025
    If there were international affairs Oscars in the category of biggest return for least investment, then the Russian president would have won hands down after the fiery blow-up between the US and Ukrainian presidents, Donald Trump and Volodymyr Zelensky, in the White House last Friday (February 28, 2025). The meeting itself would probably win in the category of most unexpected screenplay, given the astonishing shouting match between the two leaders.The rift deepened on Monday, with Mr Trump blasting Mr Zelensky for saying that the end of the war was still “very, very far away” when he should be “more appreciative” of US support. The White House also confirmed that Washington was pausing military aid to Ukraine.Does that now mean it’s all over for Zelenskyy? The minerals deal—initially floated by Ukraine and then eagerly embraced by Trump—certainly seems off, for now at least. And gone with it is any chance of an American security guarantee, however tenuous that might have been in the first instance. The only upside, if you can call it that, is that there is now absolute clarity that the United States under Donald Trump can no longer be relied upon as a partner when it comes to the future of Ukraine.Even if Zelensky and Trump can somehow miraculously mend their relationship, it is not clear whether any deal would be worth the mea culpa and additional concessions that would be required of Ukraine. Trump, after all, has made his own unpredictability—or maybe just his poorly disguised lack of self-control—a key feature of his approach to foreign policy.This is something worth bearing in mind in light of discussions that Ukraine may need a different leader, one more committed to peace than winning back lost territory, as Trump’s national security adviser, Mike Waltz, suggested over the weekend. A different Ukrainian leader would still have to deal with the same US president, even though there may be less personal acrimony in their relationship.All eyes are now on Europe, where the near-certainty of fundamentally altered transatlantic relations seems to have finally sunk in. An urgently convened defence summit in London on Sunday (March 2, 2025) brought some concrete results, including a pledge from the UK to supply Ukraine with air defence missiles worth £1.6 billion. Plans for European security guarantees—provided by a “coalition of the willing” across the EU and NATO—are also beginning to take shape. A Special European Council on March 6, 2025, is likely to reveal further details on how much European leaders are willing to mobilise, and how soon.Funding these endeavours will still prove challenging. One avenue available to Europe remains seizing billions in frozen Russian assets, not just using the interest they generate. In Germany, where talks on forming a new grand coalition are under way following the country’s February 23 elections, there is talk of a €400 billion defence fund. Other options include a European rearmament bank and a common European defence fund, both built around the “coalition of the willing” and thus likely able to circumvent traditionally cumbersome EU decision making. Some of these efforts could also be kick-started by re-directing the €93 billion left in the EU’s COVID recovery fund. The surge in the share prices of major European defence contractors, including BAE Systems, Rolls Royce, and Rheinmetall, indicate that there is confidence in the private sector that European states will procure more military equipment. This, in turn, is likely to lead to more corporate investment in Europe’s defence industrial base in anticipation of higher sales and profits.Time is running out for both Ukraine and Europe. Trump’s deal with Putin might just be a deal that lifts American sanctions against Russia, cuts Ukraine off any US support, and limits, or perhaps even completely revokes, the US security guarantee to Europe through NATO and with it any effective deterrence against further Russian aggression. It may not come to this, at least not yet, but in light of how the Trump administration is treating all of its once-close allies and partners, such an outcome is now more than a far-flung and improbable scenario.For now, Putin may think that he can just sit back and enjoy the chaos. But part of what is likely to have led to the outbursts in the White House is the frustration that Trump has experienced in his relationship with the Kremlin. Moscow may not exactly be winning its war against Ukraine, but it is definitely not losing. The pace of territorial gains may have slowed over the past few weeks, but this might also just be the calm before the storm of a Russian spring offensive. In the meantime, daily Russian airstrikes, often involving hundreds of drones have continued unabated, damaging Ukrainian infrastructure and morale.The challenges that Ukraine and its European partners face are significant, but they are not insurmountable. A small ...
    Show more Show less
    7 mins
  • Leaving Washington without a deal, has Zelensky gambled away Ukraine's future?

    Leaving Washington without a deal, has Zelensky gambled away Ukraine's future?
    Mar 1 2025
    The visit of Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky to the White House on February 28, 2025, has not gone to plan. There were extraordinary scenes as a press conference between Zelensky and Trump descended into acrimony, with the US president loudly berating his opposite number, accusing him of “gambling with world war three” — a familiar Russian talking point.“You either make a deal or we’re out,” Trump told Zelensky. His vice-president, JD Vance, also got in on the act, blaming the Ukrainian president for “litigating in front of the American media”, and saying his approach was “disrespectful”. At one point he asked Zelensky: “Have you said thank you even once?”Reporters present described the atmosphere as heated with voices raised by both Trump and Vance. The New York Times said the scene was “one of the most dramatic moments ever to play out in public in the Oval Office and underscored the radical break between the United States and Ukraine since Mr Trump took office”.Underlying the angry exchanges were differences between the Trump administration and the Ukrainian government over the so-called “minerals deal” that Zelensky was scheduled to sign, and in particular over what the US would offer Ukraine in terms of security guarantees in the event of a peace deal with Russia.With the meeting between the two presidents and their teams cut short and Zelensky leaving Washington early, the deal seems off the table for now. Trump all but closed the door on Zelensky when he posted on his Truth Social platform that Zelensky could come back “when he is ready for peace.”How much of a loss is this for Ukraine?The deal looked more like a memorandum of understanding that leaves several vital issues to be resolved later. On offer was the creation of a “reconstruction investment fund”, to be jointly owned and managed by the US and Ukraine.Into the proposed fund were to go 50% of the revenue from the exploitation of “all relevant Ukrainian government-owned natural resource assets (whether owned directly or indirectly by the Ukrainian government)” and “other infrastructure relevant to natural resource assets (such as liquified natural gas terminals and port infrastructure).”This means that private infrastructure — much of it owned by Ukraine’s wealthy oligarchs — was likely to become part of the deal. This had the potential of further increasing friction between Zelensky and some very powerful Ukrainians.Meanwhile, US contributions were less clearly defined. The preamble to the agreement makes it clear that Ukraine already owes the US. The very first paragraph notes that “the United States of America has provided significant financial and material support to Ukraine since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022”.This figure, according to Trump, amounts to $350 billion. The actual amount, according to the Ukraine Support Tracker of the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, is about half that.Western and Ukrainian analysts have also pointed out that there may be fewer mineral and rare earth deposits in Ukraine than are currently assumed, and they may be less accessible. The working estimates have been based mostly on Soviet-era data.Since the current draft left details on ownership, governance and operations to be determined in a future fund agreement, future rounds of negotiations were inevitable.From a Ukrainian perspective, this should have been seen as more of a strength than a weakness. It left Kyiv with an opportunity to achieve more satisfactory terms in future rounds of negotiation. Even if improvements would only be marginal, it would keep the US locked into a process that is, overall, beneficial for Ukraine.Take the example of security guarantees. The draft agreement offers Ukraine nothing anywhere near Nato membership. But it notes that the US “supports Ukraine’s efforts to obtain security guarantees needed to establish lasting peace”, adding that “participants will seek to identify any necessary steps to protect mutual investments.”The significance of this should not be overstated. At its bare minimum, it is an expression of intent by the US that falls short of security guarantees but still gives the US a stake in the survival of Ukraine as an independent state.But it was an important signal both in terms of what it does and does not do — a signal to Russia, Europe and Ukraine.Trump did not envisage that the US will give Ukraine security guarantees “beyond very much”. He seemed to think that these guarantees can be provided by European troops. While the Kremlin had already cast doubts on this idea, European leaders, including the British prime minister, Sir Keir Starmer, had carefully prepared the ground for this with Trump.This meant that the idea was not completely off the table. On the contrary, because the US commitment is so vague, it gives Trump leverage in every direction—if he and Zelensky find a way ...
    Show more Show less
    7 mins
adbl_web_global_use_to_activate_webcro768_stickypopup